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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

MECHANICS' LIENS AND PUBLIC WORKS BONDS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
By
EDWARD H. CUSHMAN*
I. MECHANICS' LIEN RIGHTS

Introduction
The right of a mechanic to a lien against a structure for labor and material
furnished has no existence at common law or in equity. A mechanic's lien is purely
statutory.'
The first statute in the United States was enacted by the General Assembly
of Maryland, in 1791.2 Such right of lien with respect to private work exists in
every state of the Union. Under the Pennsylvania system where the right of lien
has not been waived, a subcontractor and materialman has a right of lien directly
on the building and the curtilage appurtenant thereto whether or not there is any
money due by the owner to the contractor.
In other jurisdictions, of which New York is an example, the right of lien
is limited to the unpaid portion of the contract price, and in those jurisdictions
the owner and contractor may not contract away the subcontractor's right to this
unpaid portion of the construction price.
Persons Who May File a Claim
The person who contracts directly with the owner of the property is termed
the contractor, and, of course, has the right of lien. Persons who enter into contracts directly with the contractor are termed subcontractors, and each subcontractor
may file and maintain a mechanic's claim. One who furnishes material to or performs labor for a subcontractor is not entitled to a mechanic's claim against the
property in and about the erection or alteration of which said labor or material
was furnished. Such mechanics and materialmen are not considered as having done
work or furnished material on the credit of the building but rather on the faith in
their Lmployer.8
Property Subject to Lien
A mechanic's claim may be filed for either the erection and construction or
the alteration and repair of a building or structure owned by a private individual
firm or corporation. A mechanic's claim may not be maintained for excavating if
no building is erected, 4 but if, after constructing the foundation walls, work is
* LL.B. Temple University; Author of "Law of Mechanic's Liens in Pennsylvania and Bonds on
Public Improvements"; Member of the Philadelphia and Washington, D. C. Bar Associations. The
manuscript was the basis of Mr. Cushman's lecture at the Seminar on Creditors' Rights & Remedies
held at the Dickinson School of Law September 10 and 11, 1954.
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Knelly v. Horwath, 208 Pa. 487, 57 Atl. 957 (1904).
Act of December 19, 1791, Laws of Maryland, c. XLV, § X.
Hamilton v. Means, 155 Pa. Super. 245, 38 A.2d 528 (1944).
Alguire v. Keller, 68 Pa. Super. 279 (1917).
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abandoned by the owner, a claimant may maintain a lien for the work of excavating
and for labor and materials furnished in and about the erection of the foundation
walls. The Act of Assembly expressly provides that the right of recovery by lien
shall exist where the structure or other improvement is never completed but through
iio fault of the claimant, unless it be destroyed by fire or other casualty. 5
A mechanic's claim may not be maintained against an engine house, pumping
station or other structure essential to the operation of a public service corporation.
The decisions of our courts, as well as the statutes relating to the subject, are based
on the policy of the law intending to keep intact property belonging to and essential
in the operation of a public service corporation so that its creditors may not seize
and sell the same piecemeal and, by thus disabling it, defeat the purpose for which
it was created by rendering it unable to perform its duties to the public. The section of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901 which attempted to confer the right of

lien for labor and materials furnished to structures essential to a public service
6
corporation was held to be unconstitutional.
When we seek to consider the property for which a mechanic's lien claim
may be filed, we find, on the one hand, decisions like Parkhillv. Hendricks,7 which
holds that a claim may not be maintained for grading and sodding a lawn surrounding a suburban house and for planting shade trees along the sidewalk in
front of the building and placing wire protectors against the trees, and the more
liberal approach illustrated by Porter Screen Mfg. Co. v. Hunter,8 which holds that
it is not the duty of the court to decide as a matter of law what can and what cannot be used in the erection and construction of a building, the court submitting to
the jury the question whether materials furnished in installing wire window's and
door screens in an apartment house was with the intent of the owner to make the
screens a permanent part of the building and whether they had in fact become a
part of the building. 9
5 § 19, Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901.
6 Vulcanite Paving Company v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, 220 Pa. 603, 69 Atl. 1117
(1908); McNulty Bros. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 272 Pa. 442, 116 Atd. 362 (1922).
7 53 Pa. Super. 9 (1913).
8 69 Pa. Super. 22 (1918).
9 Lower court decisions include a decision that a mechanic's lien may not be filed for the installation of a gas range and kitchen cabinet in the construction of a dwelling house, Philadelphia
Gas Range Company v. Shallcross, 20 D. & C. 118 (1934) ; that a mechanic's lien may properly
be filed for plumbing work done in connection with alterations and repairs to a dwelling, including the excavation of a ditch for the purpose of laying drainage pipes to a cesspool and for the
laying of such a pipe, since the work was necessary to make the dwelling habitable and afford
necessary and proper drainage, Haas v. Wagner, 78 D. & C. 478 (1951); and that a jury may
properly find that a pool formed by damming up a creek and lining the bottom with concrete and
used for swimming purposes is a reservoir within the meaning of the mechanics' lien law, Bechtel
v. McCormack, 80 D. & C. 189 (1952). In Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 At. 321 (1933),
it was held that a mechanic's lien could be maintained for an automatic sprinkler, system installed
in the original construction of a building. In this case a lien was allowed even though the equipment had been installed under a bailment lease contract which provided that title should not pass
nor the equipment become part of the realty until fully paid for. This decision resulted in the
Act of July 12, 1935, P. L. 667, which provides: "From and after the passage of this act, no person,
partnership or corporation furnishing material, supplies, fixtures or equipment for the erection,
alteration, repair or remodeling of any building or structure, where such person, partnership or
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The Claim Against the Owner
A mechanic's claim may be filed for labor or material furnished in and about
the erection and construction of a new building. It must be filed within six months
after the completion of the claimant's work. A mechanic's claim may be filed for
alterations and repairs to an existing structure, and in such case the claim must be
filed within three months after the claimant has completed his work. A claim for
alterations and repairs to be valid must be for a sum exceeding one hundred dollars.
There is no statutory limit as to the amount involved in so far as a claim for new
work is concerned.
Where the changes made in an old building are of such a character that there
is a newness of structure in the main mass of the building and an entire change of
external appearance which denotes a different building from that which gave place
to it, though in the composition of the new structure some parts of the old may
have entered, the claimant has a right to file a lien in the same manner as a claim
for new work. Every such substantial adaption of an old structure is deemed in
law to be an erection and construction. 0 However, this newness of construction
must be in the exterior, the main plan of the building, and not in its interior arrangements. Purchasers and encumbrancers can be charged with notice only if the
changes are visible on the 'exterior of the building." The lien for new work dates
back to the date of visible commencement of the work upon the ground. A claim
2
for alteration and repairs is a lien only from the date of filing.'
A mechanic's lien against the estate of a lessee must be filed within three
months from the date the claimant furnished the last of his labor and materials,
and thus the formal notice required by Section 8 of the act must be served at least
one month before the claim is filed and within forty-five days after the last of
the claimant's work was done or material furnished.13
Although the language of the statute does not expressly say so, a distinction
has long been recognized between the claim of a contractor and the claim of a
subcontractor, terminal dates generally speaking being sufficient in the case of
a contractor, but further details being required in the case of a subcontractor. 13
corporation furnished such material, supplies, fixtures or equipment under bailment lease, or conditional sales contract, or any other instrument or contract by which the person, partnership or
corporation so furnishing such material, supplies, fixtures or equipment, reserves the title to
such material, supplies, fixtures or equipment, or the right to reacquire the title to same, shall
have any right to file any mechanic's lien claim to secure payment for such material, supplies,
fixtures or equipment." See Jennings v. Dubnitsky, 41 D. & C. 121 (1941) ; Jennings v. Dubnitsky,
43 Lack. J. 53 (1942).
10 Eisenberg v. Wolf, 86 Pa. Super. 169 (1926).
11 Boettiger v. Weber, 57 Pa. Super. 464 (1914); Duplex Electric Co. v. Simons, Brittain &
English, Inc., 113 Pa. Super. 163, 172 Atd. 59 (1934); Huber v. Rossell, 105 Pa. Super. 290, 161
At. 583 (1932).
12 Mechanics' Lien Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 431. § 10.
13 Keely v. Jones, 35 Pa. Super. 642; Johnson Bros. v. Smith, 63 Pitt. L. J. 441 (1915).
18a Duplex Elec. Co. v. Simons, Brittain & English, Inc., 102 Pa. Super 97, 156, Atd. 617 (1931).
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Running through the cases and influencing decisions for or against a claimant
are two distinct philosophies. The proponent of the mechanic's lien claim may
be expected to cite decisions such as American Car Co. v. Alexandria Water Co.,
which states:
"Adherence to the terms of that statute is indispensable, but the
rule must not be pushed into such niceties as serve but to perplex and
embarrass a remedy intended to be simple and summary, without in fact,
adding anything to the security of the parties having an interest in the
building sought to be encumbered.' '14
Counsel, seeing to defeat the right of a mechanic's lien, will probably quote
from decisions such as Schively v. Radell, wherein the court held:
"The common law gave no lien for labor or materials in the erection
of a building. The right to file a claim is 'entirely statutory, and in order
to avail himself of it a party must comply strictly with the terms of the
statute conferring the right." 15
Apportioned Claims
Prior to the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901 a claimant was permitted to file a
single claim against several adjoining buildings apportioning the whole sum
claimed between the several buildings so that they could severally be made answerable for the apportioned charge, each for its own fixed proportion. The act provides that no apportioned claims shall thereafter be allowed, but separate claims
with the amount due, determined by apportionment, may be filed.' 6 The law
wisely recognizes, however, that this statutory provision is inapplicable in the case
of a manufacturing plant. The word "plant" is given its ordinary meaning of
17
property owned or used in carrying on some trade or business.
Notices
A contractor need give no notice of intention to file a mechanic's claim. A
subcontractor must give an owner written notice of an intention to file his claim
on alterations and repairs made, if the amount due be not paid on or before the
day the claimant completes his work or furnishes the last of his materials. The
subcontractor, whether his claim be for new work or repairs, must give a formal
written notice of an intention to file his claim, verified by affidavit, within onehalf of the time allowed him for filing his mechanic's claim. In other words, where
the subcontractor claims for new work he must give but one notice to file a mechanic's claim. This notice must b-e served upon the owner within three months
after the completion of the claimant's contract. Where the subcontractor claims
14 215 Pa. 520, 523, 64 Atl. 683 (1906). See also Calhoun v. Mahon, 14 Pa. 56 (1850), wherein it is stated that courts "must not be hypercritical, when scanning this species of lien, and estimating its sufficiency. Such a practice must necessarily defeat a very large majority of them; a
result not to be desired when they furnish sufficient data to enable the parties subject to them, to
ascertain all that is essential for them to know."
15 227 Pa. 434, 443 (1910).
16 Sumption v. Rogers, 242 Pa. 348, 89 Atl. 121 (1913), qualifying 53 Pa. Super. 109.
17 Todd v. Gernert, 223 Pa. 103, 72 Atl. 249 (1909).
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for alterations and repairs he must serve upon the owner one written notice on
or before the completion of the work and a second written notice, verified by affidavit, within forty-five days after the completion of his contract. The object of the
notice is to inform the owner of the demand and the nature thereof in order that
he may require payment by the contractor or, in default thereof, withhold the
amount claimed from the contract price, thus securing himself against double payment.
In Mulloly v. Short,18 the court stated that the question whether a particular
notice contained language sufficiently descriptive to inform the owner of the
nature of the demand is usually a dose and difficult one. In the instant case the
claim was for labor and material used in the installation of heating and plumbing
equipment in the building. This type of labor and material being so readily distinguishable in form, nature and design from. others used in the construction of
a building, it was held that a requirement of a more detailed description would not
only be in conflict with certain earlier decisions but would also be of little advantage
to the owner, the notice being sufficient to enable the owner to determine how
much she should withhold from the contractor in order to avoid double payments.
Section 21 of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901, as amended by the Act of
April 5, 1917, P. L. 42, provides that within one month after the mechanic's
claim has been filed, a claimant, whether he be a contractor or subcontractor, must
serve upon the owner notice of filing a mechanic's claim, giving the court, term
and number of the claim and date of the filing thereof, and he must file or record
in the proceedings an affidavit setting forth the fact and manner of such service.
The purpose of this provision is to protect the owner by furnishing him an opportunity while the facts are accessible to ascertain if the claim is correct, if the
labor and materials were furnished as set forth in the lien and if the claim has
been properly and legally entered so as to bind his real estate. Compliance with
this statutory requirement is a prerequisite to the validity of the lien, and a failure
to observe the same invalidates the lien. Even the illness or death of the attorney
for the claimant is no excuse for default in serving the notice or filing the required
affidavit.1 9
Curtilage
Section 3 defines what the curtilage shall be and declares that it shall include
"other structures whether newly erected or altered, or changed for such purposes,
and forming part of a single business or residential plant." Its purpose is to define
specifically the curtilage which shall be considered appurtenant to the structure
20
which Section 2 makes subject to a lien.
By the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901, curtilage, to be regarded as appurtenant
to a building and bound by a mechanic's lien filed against it, is "such as is rea18
19
20

365 Pa. 141, 74 A.2d 136 (1950).
Flenagin v. Kearns, 66 Pitt. L. J. 848 (1918).
Schively v. Radell, 227 Pa. 434, 441, 76 At. 209 (1910).
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sonably needed for the general purpose" for which the structure is erected and
belongs to the same owner. As a rule curtilage does not extend beyond the lot on
which the building is erected, but when more land is reasonably needed for the
general purpose of the structure and at the time the same is being erected the
owner of it intends that another lot, in addition to the one on which it is being
built, shall be included in the curtilage and constitute a part of the same, it is
reasonable that a mechanic's lien should extend to both.21
If the curtilage described in a mechanic's claim contains more land than
"should be justly included therein", Section 23 of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901
furnishes an ample remedy to have the same restricted to what may be reasonably
necessary.22 In Citizens Bank of Palmerton v. Lesko, 23 upon distribution of the
proceeds of a sheriff's sale of real estate, the Suprem'e Court held:
"The objection to the liens that 'the ground described embraces more
than the curtilage of the liened buildings,' cannot prevail since, quoad
the liens, Section 23 of the Act of 1901, supra, furnishes the only method
provided for objection to the curtilage included, and of having it properly specified".
Liability of Vendor of Real Estate
Under the early acts of assembly a mechanic's claim could be filed against an
equitable title, and, notwithstanding the fact that the equitable vendee of the
lot had not been paid the full purchase money, a judicial sale on a judgment
against the equitable owner, obtained in the action upon a mechanic's claim, en24
abled the purchaser to bring ejectment against the legal owner in possession.
A proceeding upon a mechanic's claim for work done and materials furnished
upon the order of a tenant for life or for years, if carried to judgment, execution
and sale of the property, divested the owner of the fee simple of his estate and
vested the same in the purchaser from the sheriff. 25 To cure this situation the

legislature, in 1840, provided that the mechanic's lien created by prior legislation
should not be construed to extend to any greater or other estate in the ground on
which any building might be erected than that of the person in possession at the
26
time of commencing said building and at whose instance the same was erected.
Under the present law, unless a claimant can show fraud or that the real owner knowingly suffered or permitted another person to act as if he were the owner,
the lien attaches only to the interest or estate in the premises of the person for
whom the building is erected, and a sale obtained on a judgment thereon will pass
only such estate or interest in the person erecting the building. The equitable owner of real estate cannot, in the absence of fraud or other unusual circumstances,
21
22
450
2P
24
25
6

Wirsing v. Pennsylvania Hotel and Sanitarium Co., 226 Pa. 234, 238, 75 At. 259 (1910).
Toll v. Beckerman, 299 Pa. 1, 148 At. 904 (1930) ; Kantor v. Herd, 276 Pa. 519, 120 At.
(1923).
277 Pa. 174, 179, 120 Atd. 808 (1923).
Anshutz v. McClelland, 5 Watts 487 (1836).
Savoy v. Jones, 2 Rawle 343 (1830).
Act of April 28, 1940, P. L. 467, § 24.
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bind the holder of the legal title or his interest in the real 'estate for work done
or materials furnished for a building erected on the premises. He can bind his
own estate or interest in the land, but that is the limit of his power to encumber
the property by a mechanic's lien. Of course, a mechanic's lien on an equitable
estate attaches to the subsequently acquired legal estate in the same manner and
27
has the same priority as the lien of a judgment.
The Supreme Court has held the fact that the vendor visited the premises
frequently, inquired about the progress of the work, urged the contractor to proceed as rapidly with it as possible and discussed with the contractor the changes
to be made merely disclosed the interest which the vendor took in the improvement of the property, and not a fraudulent purpose on his part to mislead a mechanic's lien claimant as to how the title was held or who contracted with the
28
claimant for making the improvements.
In another case a vendee under a parol agreement of sale, being in sole possession, erected a house on the land. A mechanic's claim was filed against him as
a contractor and against the holder of the legal title as owner. The proper papers
were duly served on both defendants, judgment regularly entered against both
and a sheriff's sale had under an execution upon the said judgment. The court
decided that the title of the legal owner as well as that of the equitable owner
passed. The legal owner should have applied to the court to restrict the lien to
the estate of the vendee, but, having permitted judgment to be regularly entered
against him, the bona fide purchaser of the property at sheriff's sale was justified
29
in relying on the verity of the record.
Liability of Landlord
Section 2 of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901 provides that the claim shali
not be valid against the estate of an owner by reason of any consent given by him
to his tenant to improve the leased property unless it shall appear in writing,
signed by such owner, that the improvement was in fact made for his immediate
use and benefit. It is the duty of a claimant seeking to charge the estate of the owner to inquire as to the consent given by the owner. The test of the right to bind
the property of the landlord for work done for the tenant, however, is whether
the work has been done by the tenant for the landlord with the consent of and
ultimately to be paid for by the latter. The fact that the tenant and not the landlord is to defray the expense of the improvement is conclusive that neither the
landlord nor the building is to be subject to the cost of the work. The test in
question form is, who was to incur the cost of the repairs? If the answer is the
landlord then the building is subject to a lien, but if it is the tenant, then it is not.
The particular form of words is not regarded, but rather the subject matter of the
contract.80
27
28
29

80

Lyon v. McGuffey, 4 Pa. 126 (1846).
Connolly v. Pennsylvania Co., 70 Pa. Super. 514 (1918).
Weaver v. Lutz, 102 Pa. 593 (1883).
Seelar v. Tile Co., 58 Pa. Super. 119, 124 (1914).
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Hence, it will be seen that a landlord may not avoid a mechanic's claim by
entering into a building contract under the guise of an improvement leased1
In Williams v. Bair82 the Supreme Court sustained a judgment striking from
the record a mechanic's claim filed against a building owned by the defendant
but in possession of the tenant under a lease from him, based upon a contract for
the installation of a heating system made by the tenant with the claimant, where
the record did not show any writing signed by the landlord to the effect that the
improvement was in fact made for him for his immediate use and benefit.
Vaiver of Liens

A contractor may waive the right of himself and of all subcontractors under
him to maintain a mechanic's claim, but a subcontractor is not bound by a waiver
of which he does not have actual notice before any labor or materials were furnished by him unless the building contract or a stipulation containing a description
of the property and the waiver of liens is duly filed in the prothonotary's office
within the period prescribed by the statutes. 33
Where an owner, who had 'entered into a contract for the erection of a dwelling
which provides against the filing of mechanics' liens by subcontractors, fails to
record the no-lien contract within the time prescribed by Section 15 of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901, and where it is not filed until after work or materials
have been furnished by a subcontractor, who has no express knowledge of the
no-lien contract and who thereafter furnishes additional work or materials continuously in the erection of the building, though under separate contracts or verbal
orders, the subcontractor is not barred by the recording of the no-lien contract
from filing a lien for all work or materials furnished in the erection of the building. It is the policy of the mechanics' lien law that an owner should be required
84
to record promptly his no-lien contract.
An owner desirous of taking advantage of its provisions is bound to know
the status of the contractor with whom he is dealing, whether an individual, a
partnership or a corporation, and he is bound to see that the contract as filed is
properly and correctly indexed against the contractor by the prothonotary in the
35
judgment index, in accordance with the contractor's true status.
Where it appeared that a building contract, containing a no-lien covenant, was
entered into by A Company as contractor, was signed "A Company, by B" and
was indexed against A Company, the contractor, as defendant, it was held that
there had been a substantial compliance with the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901,

as against the contention of an unpaid materialman that the contract should have
81

Hall v. Parker, 94 Pa. 109 (1880).

2

265 Pa. 271, 108 Atd. 527 (1919).

88
84
85

Bennar v. Central Mausoleum Co., 304 Pa. 569, 156 Atd. 329 (1931).
McCrady Rodgers Co. v. Nenoff, 155 Pa. Super. 555, 39 A.2d 260 (1944).
Houser v. Childs, 129 Pa. Super. 565, 196 Atd. 547 (1938).
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been indexed against B, the individual, although the materialman also had don e
36
business with A Company as such.
In Toll v. Beckerman, 7 a building contract was made in bad faith for the
purpose of misleading and defrauding subcontractors and materialmen. Tht stipulation waiving the right to file a lien was held invalid only as to those who were
parties to the fraud or had knowledge of it before their rights in the property
were acquired.
There is no merit to the contention that the no-lien stipulation between the
owner and the principal contractor must be in a separate instrument. It is just as
effective legally if contained in the principal contract, which principal contract
8
is filed within the statutory period.3
Release of Liens
A stipulation in a building contract that the contractor shall furnish a release
from mechanics' liens before the last installment of the contract price will be paid
will not preclude the filing of a mechanic's claim by the contractor in advance of
the furnishing or procuring of such release. Such an agreement is not a waiver of
the right to file a mechanic's claim, nor is it a covenant that none will be filed.
In such case a contractor has a right to file a mechanic's claim for the work done
and materials furnished even though subcontractors have filed claims. While the
contractor may proceed in this manner to liquidate the amount due on his claim, the
court will restrain execution until the liens of subcontractors are paid and satisfied in full.

39

Objection is sometimes made to purchasing special insurance against mechanic's liens where there is a waiver of lien duly filed of record. One justification
for this additional safeguard will be found in the case of Kyle v. Graham.40 In
this case, on September 30, 1908, an owner of a tract of land entered into a contract for the erection of a dwelling house. On October 7, 1908, the owner and
the contractor entered into a second agreement whereby the contractor waived all
his rights and all rights of the subcontractors to file and maintain mechanics'
claims. On the following day this second agreement was duly filed in the office
of the prothonotary, and on that same day, after the filing of the above agreement,
a third agreement was made between the owner and the contractor which recited
the 'execution of the former agreement and set forth that upon reconsideration of
the former agreement the owner granted to the contractor alone the right to file
and maintain a mechanic's lien should he comply in all respects with the contract
of September 30. This third agreement expressly stated that this right of lien
did not extend to any subcontractor, but subsequently, subcontractors filed me86

Cole Lumber and Supply Co. v. Beck, 153 Pa. Super. 97, 33 A.2d 534 (1943), affirming 90
Pitt. L. J. 583.
87 299 Pa. 1, 148 Atd. 904 (1930).
88 Deets v. Freed, 165 Pa. Super. 495, 69 At. 159 (1946).
89 De Cesare v. Marino, 74 Pa. Super. 34 (1920).
40 46 Pa. Super. 6 (1911).
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chanics' claims contending that inasmuch as the agreement of October 8 restored
to the general contractor the right of lien, although conditional only to secure the
contract price, the right of the subcontractors was thereby revived, and the first
contract became inoperative. In dismissing this contention, the Supreme Court
held that, notwithstanding that the adopted construction of the statute may result
at times in a situation where one of a number of mechanics or materialmen can
maintain a lien when the right is denied to all others, nevertheless, it did not follow
that any injustice would be done to those excluded. The preference which mechanics' lien claimants are ordinarily permitted to enjoy is owed entirely to the
liberality of the statute. When, therefore, the same statute declares that although
by the operation of a building contract all subcontractors have been shut off from
the right of lien, the owner may, in favor of one of them, waive or surrender the
protection thus secured, and the remaining subcontractors who, to be bound, must
have had actual or constructive notice of the original waiver of liens prior to the
time they parted with their property, have no right to complain.
Where a subcontractor at the request of a contractor executes a release of
ims which is to be used by the owner in securing a loan on a mortgage on the
building, the subcontractor cannot repudiate the release because a check given to
him at the time by the contractor was not paid, if it appears that the release was
not obtained from him through any fraud on the part of the contractor, that the
contractor was not acting as the owner's agent and that the subcontractor told the
owner that he had 'executed the release, and that he could pay out all the money
41
due on account of the contract.
A letter to a materialman from the attorney for the owner, stating that the
owner intends to ask a release of liens, at which time the owner expects to make
payment, is insufficient to make the owner personally liable or the property of the
owner liable for one who failed to perfect his mechanic's lien. In such case, where
the attorney's letter did not contain any definite promise or agreement on behalf
of the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' claim or any request on his part to the
plaintiffs to withhold the filing of a lien or the taking of the necessary legal steps
to enforce their rights, the defendant assumed no responsibility for the payment
of the materials, and the order of the court below sustaining the defendant's de42
murrer and entering judgment for him will be affirmed.
The Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901 was amended by the Act of May 22, 1933,
P. L. 845, to require, among other things, the claimant to file an affidavit with
4
his praecipe for scire facias. 3
This procedural phase of a technical subject is concluded with a reminder that
Section 10 of the statute requires a claimant to issue a write of scire facias within
Brewei v. Meyers, 68 Pa. Super. 391 (1917).
Pifer v. Beals, 107 Pa. Super. 438, 163 Atl. 914 (1933).
Ash v. Krzywicki, 80 D. & C. 225, 230 (1952) ; Kempter v. Buckley, 40 Lack. L. J. 117
(1940) ; Chapin Lumber & Supply Co. v. West Lawn Fire Co., 29 Berks 245 (1937).
41
42
4P
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two years, which requirement may, by waiver in writing by the owner, be extended
44
for a further period of three years.
Priorityof Mortgage
Where a mortgage is recorded prior to the day on which a mechanic's lien
takes effect as a lien, the mortgage is entitled to priority in distribution. Upon
distribution a mortgagee, as well as the other lien creditors, may attack the validity
of the mechanic's claim, which, if found to be valid, would be entitled to priority.4 5
Advance Money Mortgages
The provision of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901 which gives mechanics'
liens priority over advance money mortgages has been held to be unconstitutional
because it violates the provision of the Constitution of 1874 in that it gives tu
mechanics' liens a higher dignity and greater priority than they possessed before
the adoption of the present Constitution. 46 Hence, where work is commenced
which is visibile upon the ground, prior to the recording of an advance money
mortgage, the mechanic's lien claimant is entitled to priority of distribution. But
if the advance money mortgage is recorded prior to the visible commencement
upon the ground of the work of building the structure, the mortgagee is entitled
to priority in distribution notwithstanding the fact that part of the money constituting the principal sum of the mortgage was paid over only as the work of
construction progressed. When a contract for advances or for the assumption of
future obligations accompanies a mortgage, it is not essential to its validity that the
engagement governing the advances be placed upon record or even be expressly
referred to in the mortgage. When such a contract obligates the mortgagee either
to make advances or assume future responsibilities on behalf of the mortgagor, this
lends a sufficient consideration to the mortgage and the lien of payments made
under such an agreement relates back to the date of recording the mortgage, and
this is true even though the advances are liquidations of assumed responsibilities
incurred after the date of a subsequent encumbrance placed upon the mortgaged
premises. 47
The following rules with respect to the lien of advance money mortgages
may be deduced from the Pennsylvania cases:
(1) Where an agreement obligates the mortgagee to make the advances, future advances are valid and secured against subsequent lienholders up to the full amount of the advances the mortgagee is so oblior after the subgated to make, whether
48 the advances were made before
sequent lien attached.
44
Pa.
46
46
47
24
48

Hiestand v. Keath, 229 Pa. 149, 78 At. 40; Mesta Machine Co. v. Dunbar Furnace Co., 250
472, 95 At. 585 (1915).
Prudential Trust Co. v. Hildebrand, 34 Pa. Super. 249 (1907).
Page v. Carr, 232 Pa. 371, 81 At. 430 (1911).
Land Title & Trust Co. v. Shoemaker, 257 Pa. 213, 101 At!. 335 (1917); Moroney's Appeal,
Pa. 372 (1855).
Land Title & Trust Co. v. Shoemaker, 257 Pa. 213, 101 Atl. 335 (1917).
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(2) Where th-e agreement provides that the mortgagee may make
unlimited advances either in time or amount or both but there is no
express obligation on the part of the mortgagee so to do, future advances
are secured as against a subsequent lienholder
only up to the amount of
49
advance made before the subsequent lien.
(3) Where only the mortgagor and mortgagee are involved, all advances obligatory or voluntary are-protected by a proper advance money
mortgage.5 5
When considering the second classification above, it must not be forgotten
that a mechanic's lien with respect to new work dates back to the visible commencement of the work upon the ground.
Effect of Sheriff's Sale
A mechanic's lien is divested by a sheriff's sale, and the claimant must resort
for payment to the fund produced by the sale. His lien follows the fund and is
payable out of it.51 If the sale takes place before the expiration of the time for
the filing of liens has expired, a claim may be made upon the fund without filing
a lien, 62 or the claimant must establish before the auditor his right to priority of
lien as he would be required to do on trial in court if the lien had not been divested by the sheriff's sale. 63
Where the fund realized from the sheriff's sale of real estate is insufficient
to pay the liens of both the contractor and the subcontractors, the claim of the contractor will be postponed to that of the subcontractors, and the contractor will not
share in the distribution until the claims of the subcontractors have been paid in
full. 54
In the case of new work, if the fund is insufficient to pay the subcontractors
in full, it is divided among the subcontractors pro rata. The claims of subcontractors

for new work abate proportionately, as the man who does the last of the painting
or plumbing comes in on an equal footing with him who completed the foundation
wall. All take procedure from the date of the commencement of the building
against the other claimants and must share ratably among themselves. 55
The Mechanics' Lien Act of 1836 had been amended piecemeal from time
to time, and one of the leaders of the Philadelphia Bar, the late Alexander Simpson, Esq., concluded that the time had come to substitute a comprehensive code.
With characteristic industry, he spent his vacation in the summer of 1900 in the
library at Boston, examining the statutes throughout the land, and returned with
a draft which became the Mechanics' Lien Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 431. This
code was intended to furnish "a complete and conclusive system in itself, so far
49
50
51

Batten v. Jurist, 306 Pa. 64, 158 At. 557 (1932).
Moats v. Thompson, 283 Pa. 313, 129 Ad. 105 (1925).
Rosenberg v. Cupersmith, 240 Pa. 162, 87 Atd. 570 (1913).

52

Kanofsky v. Carey, 89 Pa. Super. 422 (1926).

5,
54
b5

Andrews v. Fishing Creek Lumber Co., 161 Pa. 204, 28 Adl. 1018 (1894).
Keim v. McRoberts, 18 Pa. Super. 167 (1901).
Denkel's Estate, 1 Pearson 213 (1862).
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as relates to liens for labor or materials" furnished to buildings and other structures and improvements named in it.56
It has been praised as an example of lucidity in the art of legislative expression deserving high commendation, and criticized as "a clumsy attempt to codify
the Act of June 16, 1836, and prior and subsequent legislation, relating to Me57
chanics' Liens."
Many provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901 have been held to be

unconstitutional as divergent from and as an advance upon the law as it stood
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1874, on the ground that these
provisions violate Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution which prohibits any
special law "authorizing the ...

extension . .. of liens", or "providing or chang-

ing methods for the collection of debts".
The sections so held to be unconstitutional either in whole or in part and thu
sections held to be constitutional are tabulated on page CXVIII of the index of the
writer's book on mechanics' liens in Pennsylvania.
Did Homer nod? Justice Simpson never thought so, and there is much force
to the view that Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution of 1874 was never intended to apply to a statute such as the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1901.

Be that as it may, the judicial constructions for approximately forty years necessitate legislation to correct the current situation. The Pennsylvania provision for
waiver of liens protects the owner but frequently makes the lien law a snare and
a delusion in so far as the unpaid claimant is concerned. The New York system,
limiting recovery to the unpaid portion of the contract price affords little or no
relief when that sum is consumed in completing the defaulted contract. The recent
New Jersey decision of Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apart-

ments, Inc.,58 penalized the responsible contractor who selects a subcontractor who
subsequently defaults.
A balancing of the equities is achieved by legislation which provides that if
the owner will require the contractor to furnish a surety bond conditioned for the
payment of labor and material claims, the premises under construction or repair
are relieved from the burdens of the mechanics' lien law. This shifts the risk of nonpayment to a paid corporate surety, protects the owner and mortgagee from mechancis' liens and satisfies the moral obligation of the owner to see that payment
is made for the labor and materials furnished his premises.
Recognition of the need for such bond protection resulted in the formulation
of bond forms for private work, by a committee composed of some members of
the -New York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, the New York
56

Todd v. Gernert, 223 Pa. 103, 104, 72 At. 249 (1909).

57 Maddocks v. McGann, 12 Pa. D. R. 701 (1902); 4 Lack. 34, 16 York 184 (1902); Getz's
Sons v. Brubaker (No. 1), 17 York 81, 83 (1903).
58

105 A.2d 387 (1954).
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Building Congress, surety executives and others, which is now recommended by
the American Institute of Architects as its Form 107. 59
This new form of owners' protective performance bond is conditioned not
only for the faithful performance of the contract, but it also contains the new
provision that whenever the contractor shall be and declared by owner to be in
default under the contract, the surety will either complete the contract in accordance with its terms or will obtain bids for, submission to the owner for completing the contract, and upon determination by the owner and the surety of the
lowest responsible bid and upon the awarding of a contract for such completion,
the surety will make available as the work progresses sufficient funds to pay the
difference between the original contract price and the price of the completing contractor. By this procedure the owner will not be required to advance any sums in
excess of his original contract price to procure completion in accordance with the
terms of the contract. This bond is to be solely for the protection of the owner.
Accompany this performance bond is an additional bond in amount equal to
one-half of the contract price, conditioned for the payment of labor and material
claims. The rights and remedies under this separate bond form are substantially
similar to the rights of unpaid claimants who furnish labor and material required
in and about the construction of federal public work.
II. PUBLIC WORKS BONDS
A public body has a moral obligation to see that the persons who furnished
labor and material required in the construction of a public improvement are paid
in full.60 Congress, in recognition of this obligation, enacted the Heard Act, 61
and every state of the Union, as well as the Federal Government, now requires
contractors on certain public works to furnish a bond for the protection of labor
and materialmen. Three states, Kentucky, Maine and South Carolina, however,
lack express protective legislation, but, as a matter of policy, a bond protecting labor
and materialmen is required by the State Highway Department in each of these
three states. There is nothing ultra vires or contrary to public policy in this requirement. It is the right as well as the interest of the public body to secure good
work upon its contracts for public improvements, and there is no better policy toward that end than to satisfy honest and competent workmen and subcontractors
and materialmen that they can rely on being paid. There being no right of mechanic's liens against public work, the laborers and materialmen are, to that extent,
in the contractor's power as to pay, and that fact has a natural tendency to produce
skimped work and inferior materials by the class of men willing to run that risk.
The requirement of such a bond tends to eliminate the contractor without adeForm considered in Bill Curphy Co. v. Elliot, 207 F.2d 103 (1953).
Knapp v. Swaney, 56 Mich. 345, 23 N. W. 162 (1885); City of St. Louis v. VonPhul, 133
Mo. 561, 34 S. W. 843 (1896); Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N. M. 68,
251 Pac. 380 (1926) ; Kansas City v. Schroeder, 196 Mo. 281, 93 S. W. 405 (1906).
61 Act of August 13, 1894, 20 Stats. 278, c. 280.
69
60
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quate finances or experience (since proper underwriting will deny him the bond
essential to procure the contract) and tends to reduce the price at which material
may be obtained, since the risk of non-payment is shifted to a paid corporate surety.
Likewise, a superior grade of subcontractors and materialmen are attracted to
62
public work.
The need for corrective legislation in Pennsylvania became apparent in 1929,
when two claims arose, one for material furnished to a public school in Philadelphia and the other for material furnished to a playgorund within a mile or so from
the school. The requirements for notice by the claimant in each situation differed,
and there were other procedural steps not uniform because one public work was
biing erected for the School District of Philadelphia and the other for the City
of Philadelphia. An extended study was made of the different types of statutes
throughout the United States and of the decisions thereunder, and then the movement for corrective legislation, initiated by the old Philadelphia Builders Exchange and Employers Association, resulted in the enactment in Pennsylvania of
a series of statutes which assured the construction industry in Pennsylvania of one
of the best systems of bond protection in the United States in connection with
68
public work.
This Pennsylvania legislation provides that in addition to a performance
bond for the protection of the public body, the Commonwealth and its political
subdivisions shall obtain a second or additional bond conditioned for the prompt
payment of all material furnished and labor supplied or performed in the construction of the public work, whether or not the said material or labor enter into
and become part of the work or improvement contemplated. Each claimant who
contracted directly with the contractor may maintain a separate suit on this additional bond any time after 90 days from the date on which that claimant furnished
his labor or material up to one year from the date of final settlement. Thus, each
claimant stands on his own feet and is not prejudiced by a premature or defective
suit by another creditor. Each such suit must be brought within one year after final
settlement. A materialman who do-es not deal directly with the contractor has no
right of action on the additional bond unless he gives written notice of his claim
to the contractor or the surety within 90 days after he furnished his labor or material, stating the amount claimed and the name of the party with whom he contracted. The statutes provide that this notice shall be served either in the manner
provided by law for the service of a summons, save that service need not be made
by the sheriff, or may be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope
addressed to the contractor's at the contractor's last known place of business or
to the surety at any of its offices or places of business. If a claimant makes application to the public body, stating that the applicant has furnished material or
62 Philadelphia v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 309 (1900) ; 201 Pa. 526 (1902).
68 The problems sought to be corrected and a review of this legislation will be found in two
articles by the writer, "New Pennsylvania Bond Laws" (1932), 36 Dick. L. Rev. 69 and "Recent
Decision and Trends in Building Constructiion Law" (1935), 9 Temp. L. Q. 125, 129.
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labor in the prosecution of the work and that payment has not been made therefor, he is required to be furnished, at the applicant's cost, with a certified copy of
the additional bond and the contract. A copy of this additional bond or contract,
facie evidence of the contents and due execertified by the public body, is prima
°"
original.
the
cution and delivery of
This Pennsylvania legislation was followed in 1935 by the enactment of a
similar lines, which eliminated the problems
federal statute along substantially
64a
Act.
Heard
old
the
by
raised
This federal statute, known as the Miller Act, provides that suit on the bond
must be brought in the United States District Court for the district in which the
contract was to be performed and executed, and not elsewhere, irrespective of
the, amount in controversy in said suit. The Comptroller General is authorized
and directed not only to furnish the applicant with a certified copy of the bond
and the contract for which it was given, but also, in case final settlement of such
contract has been made, o" to furnish a certified statement of the date of such settle.
66
ment, which shall be conclusive as to such date upon the parties.
67
Among the states which have adopted this two bond system are Alabama,
68 Connecticut, 69 Vermont 70 and Wisconsin."
California,
The necessity for introducing in Pennsylvania not one act for th'e state and
all of its political subdivisions but separate statutes for certain departments of
the Commonwealth and for each of the various political subdivisions of the
state has whittled away somewhat th'e desired uniformity. The additional bond now
required by the Pennsylvania State Highway Department permits recovery for
public utilities in or in connection with the prosecution of
services rendered by
72
the highway work.
The Public School Code of 1949 enlarges the coverage under the additional
the work" .7 3
bond by the vague phrase, "all machinery used in the prosecution of
Where the bond is in the form prescribed by the state highway law, a claim
imfor rental of machinery required in and about the construction of a highway
7 The
a
bond.
of
scope
the
within
material
or
labor
for
a
claim
provement is not
64 This Pennsylvania procedure bill will be found in 53 P. S. §§ 526-529.
64a 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 270a-270e. The problems which led up to the enactment of this federal statute
were reviewed by the writer in 1936 in "Contractors' Bonds on Federal Construction Projects", 41
Dick. L. Rev. 1.
65 For a clarification of the definition of final settlement, see Globe Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 291
U.S. 476 (1934),;

Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 244, 167 Ad. 576 (1933).

66 The contractor and his surety may not question the validity of the Comptroller General's certificate as to the date of final settlement in the absence of fraud or mistake, U.S. to use Tobin
Quarries, Inc., v. Glasscock, 27 F. Supp. 534 (1939).
67 Alabama Code, Title 50, § 16.
68 California State Government Code, §§ 14371-14375.
69 Connecticut Act of 1941, c. 234, § 649f.
70 Vermont Act of March 13, 1939, p. 135
71 Wisconsin Annotated Statutes (1949), § 289.16 (1).
72 36 P.S. § 670-404.
7-756.

78

24 P.S. §§

74

Lancaster, to use, v. George, 315 Pa. 232, 172 At. 686 (1934).
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General Assembly of Pennsylvania, in 1953, approved a bill to enlarge the bond
coverage to include rental and equipment, but the Governor properly vetoed this
bill due to a defect in its title. 75
Recovery, however, may be had under a state highway bond for oil and gaso76
in the operation of a highway equipment.
consumed
lin
The Pennsylvania statutes establishing the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis79
sion, 77 the General State Authority, 78 the State Highway and Bridge Authority
80
and the State Public School Building Authority do not contain the wise provision
limiting suit to one year after final settlement, a time now clearly defined by the
cases, 81 but do contain the more ambiguous clause permitting suit to be brought
within one year after the time the cause of action accrued. Likewise, this legislation does not 'expressly provide for notice by one who had no direct contractual
relationship to the contractor, as is contained in the 1931-1933 bond laws and
82
the Miller Act.
The variant in language proposed by the Treasury Department and adopted
in the Miller Act has resulted in a decision to the effect that the Miller Act does
not subject a contractor and his surety to liability under the payment bond to one
who has furnished material to a materialman who contracted with a general contractor. The Supreme Court distinguished between a supplier of material to a
materialman and the supplier of the identical material to a subcontractor. 83
The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that written notice
given by a materialman within the 90 day period by ordinary mail, but which was
actually received by the contractor within the 90 day period, complies with the
statutory requirements. 84 The courts have been liberal in interpreting this requirement for notice. 8 5 It has been held, however, that this statutory provision

75 H.R. 1462, session of 1953.
76 Commonwealth, to use of Atlantic Refining Company v. Ciccone, 316 Pa. 111, 173 Atl. 642
(1934). Under the Miller Act recovery may be had for rental of equipment during the period the
equipment was in use at the site of the work but not for the purchase price thereof, U.S. for use and
benefit of Jaeger Machine Co. v. S. Birch & Sons Construction Co., 43 F. Supp. 726 (1941).
Continental Casualty Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 140 F.2d 115 (1944).
77 36 P.S., § 652.
79S 71 P.S., § 1707-3.
79 36 P.S., § 3601.
80 24 P.S., § 7-781.
81 See n. 6, supra.
,2 See Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, to use, v. Baldwin Bros. Paving Co., 44 D. & C. 462
(1942).
83 MacEvoy v. United States of America, to the use of Calvin Tompkins Co. 322 U.S. 102, 64
Sup. Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 795 (1944), reversing 137 F.2d 565, which had reversed 49 F. Supp. 81.
.4 Fleisher v. U.S. to use Hallenbeck, 311 U.S. 15 (1940), affirming 107 F.2d 925 (1939);
30 F. Supp. 964 (1939).
85 Coffee et al. v. United States, for use and benefit of Gordon, 157 F. 2d 968 (1946); United
States ex rel. Hargis v. Maryland Casualty Co. et al., 64 F. Supp. 522 (1946); U.S., to use of
Korosh v. Otis Williams Co., 30 F. Supp. 590 (1939).
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for notice is without ambiguity, and the required notice is a jurisdictional pre86
requisite to an action for the use and benefit of a claimant.
The constitutionality of this Pennsylvania bond legislation has been sus87
tained.
The enactment of the two bond system has resulted in the prompt payment of
legitimate claims and is now regarded as being definitely in the public interest not
only by the suppliers of material and subcontractors but even by bonding company
executives who joined in sponsoring the broad form of coverage and simplified
procedure described in the A.I.A. forms 107, intended for private work. Year after year interested groups sponsor the enactment of the two bond system in the
several states, and the greater the uniformity and the simplicity of procedure and
coverage, the more the legislation will be in the public interest.
86 U.S., to use of John A. Denie's Sons v. Bass, 111 F.2d 965 (1940) ; U.S., to use Kewaunee
Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Guarantee Co., 37 F. Supp. 561 (1939).
87 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 183, 167
AtI. 793 (1933).

